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Abstract 
Building on recent contributions to the New Economic Geography literature, this paper analyses 
the relation between asymmetric market size, trade integration and business income tax 
differentials across countries. First, relying on a foot-loose capital model of tax competition, we 
illustrate that trade integration (or decreasing trade costs) reduces the importance of relative 
market size for differences in the extent of corporate taxation between countries. Then, using a 
dataset of 26 OECD countries over the period 1982-2004, we provide supportive evidence of 
these theoretical predictions: i.e., market size differences are strongly positively correlated with 
corporate income tax differences across countries but, crucially, trade integration weakens this 
link. These findings are obtained controlling for the potential endogeneity of trade integration 
and are robust to various alternative specifications and robustness checks. 
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“You’ve had a broad substantial reduction in corporate tax rates outside 
the US. That occurs at a time when it’s much easier (...) for companies 
to shift investment and income to take advantage of lower tax rates 
overseas. (...) To have a more competitive system, you want to try to 
bring down the rate closer to the range of our major trading partners.” 
(Timothy Geithner, US Treasury Secretary,  
Wall Street Journal, 28-30 January 2011, 9) 
 
1. Introduction 
Looking at the evolution of corporate tax rates in developed countries over the last three decades, 
two central observations stand out. The first is a decline in corporate tax rates (Figure 1, left-
hand side). For example, between 1982 and 2007 OECD countries on average reduced their 
statutory and effective average corporate income tax rates by, respectively, 41 percent (from an 
average of 47% to an average of 27%) and 35 percent (from an average of 37% to an average of 
24%).1 While the highest statutory corporate tax rate within the OECD stood at 65% (Israel) in 
1982, it had fallen to 41% (Japan) in 2007. The second is the presence of important corporate tax 
disparities across countries despite this downward trend in tax rates. Indeed, while the standard 
deviation of the distribution of effective marginal, effective average, and statutory tax rates 
across OECD countries fell substantially between 1982 and 2000, this decline appears to have 
bottomed out since then, even though significant variation remains (Figure 1, right-hand side).  
 
--- Figure 1 about here --- 
 
Recent empirical work indicates the important role of such tax differences for FDI flows or 
firm location (e.g., Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2005; Brülhart et al., 2009; Kammas, 2011). Empirical 
analyses aimed at understanding what allows some countries to sustain higher tax rates than 
others have, however, not followed suit.2 Yet, such insights can have important policy 
implications. The quote by US Treasury Secretary Geithner at the onset of this article, for 
example, indicates that a central reason behind the US’ planned overhaul of the corporate 
                                                 
1
  This steep decline is also present when looking only at countries that were OECD members throughout the 1982-
2007 period. 
2
  While numerous studies analyse the decline in corporate tax rates (e.g., Devereux et al., 2002, 2008; Davies and 
Voget, 2008; Exbrayat, 2011), Gilbert et al. (2005) is, to the best of our knowledge, the only study analysing 
determinants of corporate tax rate differentials. Compared to that study, we provide a firmer theoretical rationale 
for the analysis, address potential endogeneity problems, control for the influence of various country-level 
variables, and employ a wider sample of countries (i.e., 26 OECD countries versus 15 European countries). 
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taxation system lies in fears that increasing global economic integration is undermining the US’ 
ability to sustain higher tax rates compared to its main trading partners.3 
This article takes an initial step towards explaining what drives corporate tax differentials 
across countries, focusing on the role of economic integration. From a theoretical perspective, we 
exploit insights from the tax competition literature based on New Economic Geography (NEG) 
frameworks. Recent contributions to this literature indeed predict that, in an environment of 
increasing returns to scale and imperfect trade integration, the most populated countries can 
sustain higher corporate taxes because firms located in these countries enjoy an ‘agglomeration 
rent’ that reduces their sensitivity to countries’ relative tax policies (Ludema and Wooton, 2000; 
Kind et al., 2000; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004). However, and crucially, bigger countries lose 
this advantage with increasing trade integration (or falling trade costs) because the site of 
production then becomes less relevant (Ottaviano and van Ypersele, 2005; Gaigné and Riou, 
2007; Haufler and Wooton, 2010). Consequently, the NEG literature predicts that tax disparities 
across countries reflect the fact that some countries are exposed to tax competition to a different 
degree than others, depending on the level of trade costs and their relative market size. This 
paper’s central contribution lies in assessing such claim’s empirical relevance.  
Our analysis proceeds in two stages. First, we exploit a simple foot-loose capital model of 
tax competition in spirit of Ottaviano and Van Ypersele (2005) and Haufler and Wooton (2010) 
to offer a detailed understanding regarding the role of asymmetric market size and trade 
integration for corporate tax differences across countries. This analytical treatment allows us to 
focus precisely on the two empirically testable predictions that follow from such models: a) tax 
differentials are a function of the coexistence of imperfect trade integration and asymmetric 
market sizes and b) increased trade integration reduces the ability of large countries to set higher 
taxes. Second, we evaluate these predictions employing data for 26 OECD countries (thus 
generating up to 325 country-pairs) over the period 1982-2004. Unlike existing empirical tax 
competition studies – which mostly estimate tax reaction functions, where the tax rate in one 
                                                 
3
  Although we focus on international tax competition, countries often use a variety of measures to increase their 
attraction towards international firms. Pieretti and Zanaj (2011), for example, recently analysed the case where 
jurisdictions compete for foreign capital both via taxes and public inputs that enhance firms’ productivity while 
Charlton (2003) looks at investment subsidies, which can often reach a substantial share of the investment’s value. 
Also, some countries give preferential treatment to highly mobile tax bases (e.g., Ireland levies a lower tax rate on 
manufacturing and financial services compared to other sectors). We abstract from such cross-sectoral 
discrimination and refer the reader to, for example, Wilson (2005) and Marceau et al. (2010) for recent treatments. 
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country is linked to a population- or distance-weighted average of competing countries’ tax rates 
(e.g., Devereux et al., 2002, 2008; Davies and Voget, 2008; Exbrayat, 2011) – we thereby 
explicitly model the tax rate difference between each country-pair. The reason is threefold. First, 
the focus of reaction function analyses lies on absolute levels of taxation. This can be 
misleading, however, since what matters for firms’ location choices – and thus also for tax 
competition – is the difference in corporate tax rates between countries rather than the absolute 
level of taxation in each country (see also Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2005). Moreover, tax 
differentials more directly capture the idea that investors arbitrate not only among foreign 
locations, but also between each foreign location and domestic investment. Finally, while 
estimation of tax reaction functions allows analysing the decline in corporate taxes rates, it does 
not provide direct insights regarding the determinants of tax differentials, which is our central 
concern. 
Our results support the model’s predictions. Specifically, we show that the tax gap responds 
positively to population size differences between countries and, crucially, that this relationship is 
significantly attenuated by trade integration. Our results provide strong evidence since the 
relatively highly-integrated nature of OECD countries’ economies provides an environment least 
likely to expose substantial effects. Moreover, to properly identify the trade integration effect 
and control for the endogeneity of standard measures of trade integration, we extract the level of 
trade liberalisation between each country-pair from a gravity equation controlling for remoteness 
by the use of country fixed effects (Rose and Van Wincoop, 2001; Feenstra, 2003; Redding and 
Venables, 2004; Head and Mayer, 2011). Our findings are also robust to a number of alternative 
specifications (e.g., different definitions of the dependent variable) and robustness checks (e.g., 
accounting for third-country or income effects). As such, we provide significant empirical 
support for the idea, recently brought forward in the NEG literature, that tax disparities across 
countries reflect these countries’ varying exposedness to international competitive forces. 
The structure of the article is as follows. In the following section, we set up a foot-loose 
capital model of tax competition to derive testable hypotheses on the relation between corporate 
taxation, trade integration and population differences. The empirical verification of these 
predictions is described in section 3. The last section concludes and discusses some avenues for 
further research. 
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2. The model 
To derive testable predictions regarding the relation between asymmetric market size, trade 
integration and business tax differentials, we use the model of Ottaviano and Van Ypersele  
(2005) simplified, without loss of generality, by assuming oligopolistic rather than monopolistic 
competition. The economy consists of two imperfectly integrated countries (i=1,2), which 
compete to attract firms. These firms produce a homogeneous good, labelled x, under increasing 
returns to scale and Cournot competition. Another private good, the numéraire z, is produced 
under perfect competition and is freely traded. There are two factors of production, physical 
capital and labour, whose total endowments are denoted K and L, respectively. Total factor 
endowments are fixed and equally distributed across individuals in either country. However, we 
assume that a share 5.01 >σ of the total population lives in country 1. While these workers are 
immobile, they can invest their capital wherever they want. The public sector in each country is 
represented by a benevolent government, which imposes a lump-sum tax ti on capital invested in 
its country. If this tax is positive, the resulting tax revenues Ti are redistributed in a lump-sum 
way to the workers, while if a government subsidizes capital these expenditures are financed 
through lump-sum taxation of workers.4 
 
2.1.   Consumption 
Consumers in both countries share the same quasi-linear utility function:  
          (1)                                                            
2
2
iiii zxaxu +−=
β
 
with a > 0 and { }2,1∈i . Every resident in the economy supplies one unit of labour. The wage rate 
in each country is determined in the numéraire industry, which uses labour as its only input and 
requires one unit of labour to produce one unit of the good. Free trade in the numéraire thus 
equalizes the wage across countries (w) to unity.5 Moreover, each resident receives income from 
capital at the world net return to capital, denoted by r (which is endogenously determined by a 
bidding process for capital, see below). Thus, the budget constraint for a representative consumer 
in country i is:  
                                                 
4
  This framework is close to the standard model of asymmetric tax competition (Bucovetsky, 1991; Wilson, 1991), 
so that any differences in the model’s predictions are only imputable to the assumption of imperfect competition 
and positive trade costs.  
5
  To ease the interpretation of our results, we denote the wage by w (rather than 1) throughout the paper. 
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  )2(iii
i
i xpz
L
T
L
K
rw +=++
σ
 
where pi denotes the price of good x in country i. 
Given (1) and (2), individual demand for the manufactured good in country i is given by  
( ) β/ii pax −=  so that total demand for this good in each country is:  
       )3(βσ
i
ii
pa
LX
−
=  
Intuitively, aggregate demand is higher in the larger country as it benefits from a market size 
advantage (i.e., 21 σσ > ), which makes its market more profitable for firms. 
 
2.2.   Firms 
There are increasing returns to scale in the oligopolistic industry. Indeed, producing any amount 
of good x requires a fixed amount of capital, which is normalized to one so that there is a perfect 
correspondence between the number of firms and the capital stock (K). Besides, firms incur a 
marginal cost of one labour unit for each unit produced.6 This good is traded at a cost of τ units 
of the numéraire per unit shipped between the two countries, which raises the marginal cost of 
serving the foreign market to (w + τ).7 
Firms are able to segment their markets by choosing the quantities to sell on the domestic 
and the foreign market independently. Therefore, operating profit of each firm in country i is:  
          ( ) ( ) )4(ijjiiii xwpxwp τ−−+−=Π  
where xij denotes sales in country j. Maximizing profits taking into account demand (equation 3) 
yields the following output levels for a firm located in a country i:  
( )
1
1
    ,
1 +
+−−
=
+
+−
=
K
KwaL
x
K
KwaL
x
jj
ij
ji
ii
λτ
β
στλ
β
σ
 
where jλ  stands for the share of firms in country j (with 1=+ ji λλ ). Intuitively, all else equal, 
an exporter sells less in any given market than an indigenous rival (xij < xii) due to trade costs 
                                                 
6
 The marginal cost is normalised to zero in Ottaviano and Van Ypersele (2005). We normalise it to one so that the 
framework is closer to the standard tax competition literature where production of the private good requires capital 
and labour. The difference is, however, irrelevant for our results. 
7
  Trade costs must be understood in a general sense, as including non-tariff barriers and transportation costs. 
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(although we focus here on the case where trade costs are low enough to ensure that xij and xji are 
positive).8 The resulting equilibrium price in country i is:  
.
1+
++
=
K
wKKa
p ji
τλ
 
Three elements regarding this equilibrium price are worth noting explicitly. First, the consumer 
price level increases with trade barriers (because local firms are more protected against foreign 
competition). Second, it is decreasing in the number of firms located in this country (though this 
competition effect diminishes as trade costs fall). Finally, the export price net of transport cost 
(that is, τ−ip ) is a decreasing function of trade costs and this relationship is strengthened by the 
toughness of competition in the foreign market. 
Inserting these equilibrium prices in (4) yields an expression for short-run operating profits:  
( ) 22
1
1
1 







+
+−−
+







+
+−
=Π ∗
K
KwaL
K
KwaL jjji
i
λτ
β
στλ
β
σ
 
In the long-run, net profits equal zero due to free entry and exit.9 Thus, the equilibrium rate of 
return is determined by a bidding process for capital, which ends when no firm can earn a strictly 
positive net profit at the equilibrium market price; that is, 
.iii tr −Π=
∗
 
The location equilibrium of capital can now be found by solving the arbitrage condition 
according to which no unit of capital can earn a higher net return by being invested in another 
country; that is, when rtt =−Π=−Π ∗∗ 2211 . The resulting share of firms in country 1 is:  
   ( ) ∆+−−−−+= β
τ
τ
τ
σλ
LK
K
wa
K 2
1
1 2
122
2
12
2
1
           (5) 
where ( )τ−− wa 22  is positive under the trade condition (see footnote 8) and ∆ = t1 – t2 stands 
for the tax gap between countries 1 and 2. Let us first comment on the location of firms without 
taxation so that ∆=0. As soon as trade is costly, the country with a larger demand for the 
increasing returns industry attracts more production relative to its population ( ( ) 11 0 σλ >=∆ ) 
                                                 
8
  Exports are profitable when ( ) ( )1+−=< Kwatradeττ , with wa >  so that it is also profitable to sell on the 
domestic market. 
9
  By contrast, Haufler and Wooton (2010) assume that there is no free entry so that firms retain positive profits also 
in the long run. While this assumption affects the equilibrium tax level, it is innocuous for the properties of the tax 
gap between countries (which is our prime concern). 
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because firms save on trade costs by locating in this country.10 This is the ‘home-market effect’. 
Importantly, there is a threshold of trade cost – i.e., ( )( ) ( )12/122 11 −+−−= σστ KwaMCP  – under 
which it becomes so cheap to serve the foreign market through exports that a core-periphery 
structure emerges, characterized by the complete concentration of firms in the biggest country. 
Now, in the presence of different tax policies, the share of firms in country 1 will be relatively 
smaller (larger) than it would be at the free-market equilibrium (i.e., in the absence of 
governments and taxation) when that country sets the higher (lower) tax and ∆ > 0 (∆ < 0). 
Importantly, firms’ responsiveness to tax and population differentials are strengthened by the fall 
in trade costs, so that tax competition becomes fiercer.  
 
2.3. Tax competition 
We assume that each government is benevolent. Inserting the budget constraint in the national 
welfare, we get the following objective function for government of country i:  
KrLwTLSW iiiiii σσσ +++=  
where Si =(a–pi)² / 2β denotes consumer surplus. Thus, we can break down national welfare into 
four components: aggregate consumer surplus, tax revenues (redistributed to residents if Ti > 0 or 
paid by them if Ti < 0), total labour income and total return to capital. Before continuing the 
analysis, we briefly summarize how each component reacts to a change in taxation. By 
introducing equilibrium prices in the consumers’ surplus, it is easy to show that each government 
has an incentive to set a low tax burden on capital (dSi/dti < 0); this reduces the price prevailing 
in the domestic market, and increases domestic consumers’ surplus. Yet, raising the capital tax 
has a positive effect on tax revenues (Ti) provided that the tax base elasticity is less than one in 
absolute value. Both effects are stronger for the most populated country. Finally, the effect of 
taxation on the return to capital is a priori ambiguous. By inducing more competition among 
firms, a tax cut reduces operating profits, but the lower tax burden has a direct positive effect on 
the net return to capital. We can show that the latter effect dominates at the equilibrium, and that 
                                                 
10
 Even though the wage rate is equalised across countries, it erodes the attractiveness of country 1. Intuitively, the 
negative impact of the wage rate on operating profits is proportional to the output, and is thus more detrimental to 
profits from domestic sales than those from foreign sales. Recalling that domestic sales are larger for firms located 
in the bigger market, the wage rate reduces the profit differential between country 1 and 2, and therefore reduces 
the relative attractiveness of country 1. 
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the negative effect of taxation on the return to capital is stronger in absolute terms for the smaller 
country. 
We now solve the tax game by distinguishing between interior equilibria (when each 
country has some industrial firms) and the core-periphery equilibrium (when all industrial firms 
reside in the biggest country). The game takes place in two stages. In the first, governments 
simultaneously choose their tax rates while in the second, firms and consumers make their 
choices taking tax rates as given. The game is solved by backward induction. 
 
2.3.1 Nash tax gap under interior equilibrium configuration 
When trade liberalization is low enough for interior equilibria to be sustainable, the tax base 
elasticity in both countries is positive and the tax reaction functions are:  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ( )
( ) ( )[ ]11
1111
1
1
1
2
11
1111
2
1
1
1
3221
12131212
12114
12112
4221
112252232
1214
1212
σσβ
τσσσστ
τ
σ
σ
σσβ
στσσστ
τ
σ
σ
++++
++−−+−−−
+
+−−+
+−−+
=
−+−+
+−++−−−−−
+
+−+
+−+
=
KK
KKKwa
Lt
KK
KK
t
KK
KKKwa
Lt
KK
KK
t
 
These reaction functions have two important properties that contribute to explain why the 
government of the most populated country will set a higher tax rate. First, the slope is always 
positive so that taxes are strategic complements, and this slope is flatter for the most populated 
country. Second, the reaction functions’ constant is higher for the most populated country. The 
resulting Nash tax gap between country 1 and 2 is: 
                                                        
( ) ( )
54
326
+
+−−Ω=∆∗
K
Kwa τ
β
τ
                                               (6a) 
where ( )L12 1 −=Ω σ  stands for the difference in population between countries 1 and 2 and we 
verify that ∗∆  is positive for non-prohibitive trade costs ( tradeττ ≤ , see footnote 8). From the 
second-order condition, it can be illustrated that this corresponds to a global optimum. 
Equation (6a) first of all indicates that, for non-prohibitive trade costs, the tax gap 
between both countries is increasing with their population difference provided that trade costs 
are positive ( 0/ >Ω∆∗ dd when 0>τ ). Intuitively, because firms generate higher profits by 
locating in the largest market (by saving trade costs), the tax base elasticity is lower in this 
country, which allows its government to set a higher capital tax. The government of the less 
populated country on the other hand must compensate its firms for their location disadvantage 
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via a lower capital tax. Secondly, however, equation (6a) shows that this relationship is mitigated 
as trade costs fall ( 0/2 >Ω∆∗ τddd ).11 The reason is that trade integration reduces the positive 
impact of the difference in market sizes on the difference in operating profits. Since the bilateral 
tax gap is closely related with this difference in operating profit through the arbitrage condition, 
trade integration thus limits the ability of the largest country to set a higher tax than the small 
one. Finally, observe that the level of trade costs has no direct impact on the tax differential 
when countries are of equal size (i.e., when 0=Ω ). It only matters through its influence on 
countries’ relative market size (though trade integration clearly has a direct impact on absolute 
levels of taxation). 
Substituting (6a) into (5), we get the share of firms located in the larger country in the 
presence of tax competition: 
( )( ) ( )
( )542
2222
2
1 2*
1
+
−++−+Ω
+=
KK
KKwaK
L τ
τλ  
It is easy to verify that, despite the higher equilibrium tax rate of country 1, it still hosts a more 
than proportional share of firms, and this home-market effect strengthens as trade costs fall. This 
explains why all capital is invested in the larger country as soon as trade costs fall under the 
threshold ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ]12233/212 11211* −+−+−−+−= σσσστ KKwaKCP , with MCPCP ττ <* . 
 
2.3.2. Tax gap under core-periphery equilibrium configuration 
      Let us now consider the specific case where trade costs are so low ( *CPττ < ) that all capital is 
invested in the largest country. Here, the world net return to capital is equal to the net return to 
capital in country 1. Hence, the tax base elasticity in country 1 equals zero, while the welfare in 
country 2 is unaffected by a marginal rise in .2t  The government in 1 therefore sets its tax rate at 
the highest level compatible with the government in 2 being unable to affect the location of 
firms.12 Formally, this implies that the tax differential between both countries is equal to the 
difference in gross return to capital evaluated at 11 =λ . This yields: 
                                                 
11
  This inequality holds for all a>w; that is, when domestic sales are profitable (see footnote 8). 
12
 The objective function of the government is strictly increasing in its tax rate. Indeed, when the tax base elasticity 
is equal to zero, raising the capital tax allows the government to increase tax revenues. The second-order 
condition is checked since 0/ 211
2
1 =dtWd . 
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which is positive for all values of trade costs compatible with a core-periphery equilibrium (that 
is, *0 CPττ ≤< ) and zero in the absence of trade costs.  
Clearly, the main property of the tax gap described in section 2.3.1 still holds: i.e., the tax 
gap is increasing with the difference in population between both countries 
( 0/ >Ω∆ dd CP when 0>τ ), and this relationship is weakened as trade costs fall 
( 0/2 >Ω∆ τddd CP ).13 Finally, observe that at the core-periphery equilibrium, trade costs exert a 
direct negative influence on the tax differential whereas they act only through the population 
differential at interior equilibria. 
  
 We summarize both results in the following proposition:  
Proposition 1: Assume tax competition between two benevolent governments of differently 
populated countries. For positive but non-prohibitive values of trade cost ( tradeττ < ): 
(i) the tax gap is increasing with the difference in population between both countries. 
(ii) this relationship is mitigated as trade costs fall. 
 
Before empirically testing these properties, we should note that they are robust to various 
extensions. First, as shown in Appendix A, Proposition 1 continues to hold in a three-country 
version of the model where country 1 not only competes with country 2, but should also take its 
fiscal attractiveness relative to all other countries into account when deciding upon its tax policy 
(we retained the 2-country model in the main text as this is significantly more accessible). The 
existing literature on tax competition using NEG frameworks has, to the best of our knowledge, 
not addressed such three-country settings. Second, while not reported for reason of space, the 
above properties are robust to alternative assumptions regarding the government’s behaviour: 
e.g., (1) the introduction of public good provision, (2) changes in the timing of events under the 
interior equilibria configuration (i.e., allowing the big country to act as Stackelberg leader in the 
tax game) and (3) allowing for Leviathan behaviour (full details available upon request). Finally, 
Ottaviano and Van Ypersele (2005) as well as Gaigné and Riou (2007) found qualitatively 
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similar results as in Proposition 1 using a model where mobile firms produce horizontally 
differentiated goods and consumers have quasi-linear preferences with a love for variety. 
 
3.    Empirical Analysis 
3.1.   Model specification 
To evaluate Proposition 1, we exploit an unbalanced panel of 26 OECD countries over the period 
1982-2004 (thus having maximally 325 country-pairs per period).14 Our baseline regression is: 
        
( ) ijttjiijtijtijtijtijtijt DOYPopGapPopGapTaxGap εηβϕββϕβ +++++×++= 4321  
where ij refers to a country-pair with i ≠ j and t indexes time. Before discussing the 
operationalisation of the constituent parts of this model, two comments are required. First, one 
could argue that a natural alternative to this linear specification would start by taking the 
logarithm of equation 6a, and estimate a loglinear specification. Clearly, however, given the 
large number of negative values that arises from the construction of both dependent and 
independent variables (i.e., as the difference between the values of countries i and j; see below 
for details), such loglinear specification is empirically unfeasible.15 Second, although this 
specification is general enough to test the main results of the model extended to the case of three 
countries (Proposition 1-bis in Appendix A), the explicit two-country set-up in the baseline 
model above may be deemed problematic in a multi-country world. Still, as will be discussed in 
more detail below, we address the potential influence of ‘third countries’ in a number of ways 
throughout the analysis (see the end of this section, as well as section 3.4.3). This not only 
mitigates concerns about possible mis-specification bias, it also evaluates the robustness of our 
results to the exact operationalisation of such third-country effects.  
The dependent variable – i.e., the tax gap between a pair of countries (TaxGapijt) – is defined 
as the difference between the Effective Average Tax Rate (EATR) on firms in countries i and j at 
time t. We thereby employ a weighted average of the EATR levied on machinery and buildings 
                                                                                                                                                             
13
  In the extreme case of a perfectly integrated economy (that is, τ=0), firms are indifferent between locating in 1 or 
2, so that both governments set equal tax rates.  
14
  The set of countries includes Australia, Austria, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, 
France, Great-Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, 
New-Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey and US. The starting point follows from the availability of 
corporate tax rate data (source: Loretz, 2008), while the endpoint is due to the lack of trade data after 2004 
(source: CEPII). 
15
  Redressing this negative-numbers problem by taking absolute values is also inappropriate as it critically changes 
the distribution of our main variables. 
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(see Loretz, 2008, for details of the weighting scheme), although using the EATR on buildings or 
machinery does not affect our main findings (details upon request). Clearly, as the tax gap 
between countries i and j is the same as that between countries j and i, we only include each 
country-pair once per year (and select those country-pairs ij where country i was alphabetically 
prior to country j). Note also that we employ EATR rather than the Effective Marginal Tax Rate 
(EMTR) or the statutory tax rate for two reasons. First, the statutory tax rate does not include tax 
base effects and firms are likely to decide their investment decisions based on what the entire tax 
schedule (i.e., tax base and tax rate) implies for them. Second, as our theoretical analysis is 
inspired by competition over ‘greenfield’, rather than additional, investments,16 EATR is the 
relevant measure for firms’ decision-making. Nevertheless, for reasons of comparison and 
robustness, we run our estimations also with EMTR and the statutory tax rate (see below). 
There are two central explanatory variables. First, PopGapijt stands for the difference in 
population size between countries i and j at time t (in million people) and analyzes how the tax 
gap responds to population size differences between countries (part i) of Proposition 1). One 
could argue that this reliance on the population difference takes the theoretical model overly 
literal, and that a measure based on the difference in GDP or market potential would be more 
appropriate (since Ω  effectively measures the relative size of the market). We refrain from using 
the difference in GDP to test the model because this creates an obvious endogeneity problem. 
This is not the case for the population-based measure since we are analysing corporate taxation, 
which arguably leaves individuals’ residence decisions – and thus the relative size of the 
countries’ populations – unaffected. Moreover, the population difference provides a credible 
measure of the relative market size since it is strongly and significantly positively related to the 
GDP-difference (r=0.21; p<0.01) as well as the market potential difference (r=0.65; p<0.01; this 
variable is defined in more detail in section 3.2 below). Nonetheless, we also report results using 
the latter, more general measure of market potential since multinationals set up in any given 
country – but especially for centrally located ones – may serve neighbouring countries as well 
(for these robustness checks, see section 3.4.4).17 
Second, to address part ii) of Proposition 1, we introduce the level of trade liberalisation 
(φijt) – which approximates the effect of trade costs deriving from various impediments to trade 
                                                 
16
  What is taxed is the return to capital employed as a fixed cost in the modern industry, which is equal to firms’ 
operating profits. 
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and corresponds to the general interpretation of trade costs in the theoretical model (see note 7) – 
and interact it with PopGapijt. Given the endogeneity of traditional trade openness measures (i.e., 
imports and exports as a share of GDP), our identification strategy here rests on estimating φijt 
from a gravity equation controlling for remoteness by the use of country fixed effects (Rose and 
Van Wincoop, 2001; Feenstra, 2003; Redding and Venables, 2004; for details, see section 3.3 
below). Larger values of φijt indicate closer trade integration (and thus lower trade costs), 
implying that Proposition 1 predicts a positive sign for β2 and a negative one for β3.  
We also include φijt independently in the empirical model. This is not only needed to avoid 
biased inferences on its interaction with the population differential, but also allows testing 
whether trade integration fails to have a direct impact on the tax differential – as predicted by 
equation 6a.18 Specifically, equation (6a) indicates that the level of trade costs only matters 
through its influence on countries’ relative market size at interior equilibria, whereas it has a 
direct and negative influence on the tax gap at the core-periphery equilibrium. Consequently, a 
statistically insignificant coefficient β1 would suggest that all governments consider the tax base 
elasticity to be positive, whereas a significant β1 rather indicates that one government in each 
country-pair behaves as if all industrial firms were located in its country and tax base elasticity 
equals zero. 
The vector Y represents a number of control variables that can be expected to affect tax rates 
in both countries, and therefore the tax gap between these countries. Specifically, building on a 
large political economics literature, we include the difference in country-pairs’ real GDP (in ten 
million dollars), public consumption (i.e., public sector size as a share of GDP), urbanness (share 
of population in urban areas), share of young and old in the population (under 14 and over 65 
respectively), unemployment rate, openness (imports plus exports as a share of GDP), political 
leaning of the government (1 if right-wing, 0 if centre and -1 if left-wing), a simple linear time 
trend and two dummy variables equal to 1 when one or both countries are part of the European 
Union or its precursors.19 Data definitions, summary statistics and sources are in appendix B. 
                                                                                                                                                             
17
  Note that potential endogeneity of countries’ overall market potential is negligible compared to that of their GDP. 
18
  Still, excluding φijt from the model does not affect our findings in any way. 
19
 The trade openness variable is used to control for the impact of multilateral – rather than bilateral – trade 
integration on tax differentials. As such, we evaluate the effect of bilateral trade integration, given the extent of 
multilateral trade integration. Our results remain unchanged, however, when excluding this variable. 
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Finally, Oi and Dj represent a vector of country of ‘origin’ (i.e., first in our country-pair) and 
‘destination’ (i.e., second in our country-pair) indicator variables and ηt is a set of year dummies, 
which pick up country-specific and time-specific effects. Importantly, inclusion of these fixed 
effects goes some way towards mitigating the potential bias of not explicitly introducing third-
country effects in the empirical model (as mentioned, however, we return to such effects in 
section 3.4.3).20 Note that we also experimented with country-pair fixed effects. As this 
alternative specification does not affect our main findings (details upon request), but more 
strongly reduces our degrees of freedom, we retain separate origin and destination fixed effects 
in the main analysis. 
 
3.2.    Measuring trade liberalization (and market potential) 
Following Head and Mayer (2011), we estimate bilateral trade relations from a gravity equation 
which takes the following simple multiplicative form:21 
jijiij FMFXX ××= ϕ  
with Xij the exports from country i to country j, φij the freeness of trade, and FXi and FMj as 
exporter and importer fixed effects. Formally, στϕ −= 1ijij , with ijτ  the bilateral iceberg costs and 
σ the elasticity of substitution between varieties. The exporter fixed effects typically capture the 
export capabilities of country i while the importer fixed effects capture demand from country j. 
As standard in the literature, we consider that trade freeness depends on several variables that 
either enhance or deter trade: bilateral distance (Distij), a dummy for contiguity (Cij), a dummy 
for common language (Lij) and a dummy for colonial links (Colij). Such historical elements 
provide a critical source of exogenous variation. Taking logs, our gravity regression is specified 
as follows: 
              ijtijijijijjtitijt uColLCDistFMFXX ++++++= 321lnln λλλδ                      (7) 
Attempts to include time-varying trade policy variables – such as membership of regional 
trade agreements – proved unsuccessful (i.e., the estimation model often fails to converge) as 
                                                 
20
 We thank José De Sousa for fruitful comments and discussions on this point. 
21
 We choose this empirical model because a wide range of different micro-foundations yield such an equation. 
Those include Dixit-Stiglitz’ (1977) model of monopolistic competition, Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2003) 
model based on national product differentiation, comparative advantage models such as Eaton and Kortum (2002) 
and, more recently, models incorporating firm heterogeneity with monopolistic competition and endogenous 
mark-ups using a linear demand system as in our framework (see Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008). 
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there is not enough heterogeneity in our sample with respect to these variables.22  To nonetheless 
account for such temporal influences, we estimate the trade cost equation separately for every 
year. This not only allows trade costs to change for each country-pair in each year, it also does so 
without imposing a predefined functional form on such changes – unlike, for instance, when 
introducing dummy variables for regional trade agreements or the fall of the Berlin Wall. This 
flexibility is important to pick up trade cost changes when they de facto occur (not when we 
would de jure expect them), and allows the strength of such effects to develop over time (rather 
than imposing a constant effect). The resulting model – estimated using bilateral trade data over 
the period 1980-2004 with data for trade liberalisation (both provided by the CEPII) – provides a 
very good approximation of trade flows, with an average R2 of 98% (88% when looking 
exclusively at variation within country-pairs over time), and variables used as trade cost proxies 
are statistically significant well beyond the 99% confidence level. From this set of estimations, 
we extract predicted values for bilateral trade integration as follows (see also Head and Mayer, 
2011):23 
( )ijijijijijt ColLCDist 321ˆ ˆˆˆexpˆ λλλϕ δ ++=  
Summary statistics for this measure are provided in Appendix B. These illustrate that the 
over-time (i.e., within country-pairs) standard deviation is larger than its cross-section (i.e., 
between country-pairs) standard deviation. Hence, the estimated trade integration measure varies 
substantially both in space and time. Moreover, it picks up important shifts in trade integration 
among OECD countries: e.g., our measure records substantial increases immediately following 
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, in the period surrounding the Austrian-Finnish-Swedish EU-
accession in January 1995 and around the large-scale eastward EU enlargement in May 2004, as 
well as a marked decline during the 1997-1998 global financial crises. 
While this estimation of φijt has a clear theoretical underpinning and addresses the 
endogeneity issue, extracting it from such first-stage regressions makes it a ‘generated regressor’. 
Fortunately, OLS leads to consistent coefficient estimates in the presence of generated regressors 
                                                 
22
  Moreover, regional trade agreements may be endogeneous (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007). 
23
 One can similarly extract a measure for a country’s overall market potential: i.e.,  
∑ 





=
∧∧
j
ijtjtit FMRmp ϕˆexp  (see Head and Mayer, 2011). We use this measure in the robustness check in 
section 3.4.4 below). 
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(Pagan, 1984). Moreover, and crucial, while the estimated covariance matrix of the tax gap 
estimation needs to be adjusted to account for the variability in the trade integration variable 
when evaluating specific hypothesis tests, it still allows correct inference on whether the 
coefficient estimate of the generated regressor significantly differs from 0. Hence, it allows 
consistent significance tests, which is our prime interest here (for details, see Pagan, 1984; for a 
similar approach, see Head and Mayer, 2006). 
 
3.3.    Empirical results 
Our key results are summarized in Table 1. Column (1) presents baseline results when using 
the OLS estimator. In Column (2), we relax the implicit assumption that both countries’ 
population sizes have the same effect on the tax differential between them, as this may conceal 
potential asymmetries in the observed effects. Hence, Column (2) presents results where we 
include the population size of the ‘origin’ and ‘destination’ country separately – each interacted 
with the bilateral measure for trade integration. As all country-pairs ij have country i 
alphabetically prior to country j (see above), ‘origin’ and ‘destination’ here simply imply that a 
country is comes first in the alphabet. Although the relative strength of the population variables 
therefore cannot directly be interpreted (as this obviously depends upon which country is 
selected as ‘origin’ or ‘destination’), it does allow evaluating whether any asymmetries exist in 
the country size effect.24 Throughout the analysis, we rely on Newey-West heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors and cluster standard errors by country-years to account for the non-
independence of observations (i.e., the fact that a change in the corporate tax rate in country i in 
year t not only affects country-pair ij, but also all other country-pairs including i). Such 
clustering is feasible as we have a large number of clusters (450) with relatively few 
observations (25 or less) in each cluster (see Wooldridge, 2003).25 
 
--- Table 1 about here --- 
 
                                                 
24
 We are grateful to Simon Loretz for pointing this possibility out to us. 
25
 Note that each country-pair is simultaneously part of two clusters (i.e., one for the origin-country in year t and one 
for the destination-country in year t). As these two sets of clusters are by construction highly correlated and 
partially overlapping, clustering standard errors simultaneously in both dimensions is impossible. To alleviate this 
problem, we ran all regressions using either origin-year or destination-year clustering and report the most 
conservative estimates obtained (i.e., origin-year clustering). 
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We find that the difference in population size has a positive and highly statistically 
significant impact on the difference in effective average tax rates between countries when trade 
integration is absent (i.e., φijt = 0). Hence, in line with predictions from standard asymmetric tax 
competition models without trade (e.g., Wilson, 1991; Bucovetsky, 1991), a bigger country can – 
and does – set a higher corporate income tax rate. 
Including the impact of trade integration on the relation between population differences and 
the tax gap, we see in Column (1) that, as expected, increasing trade integration significantly 
reduces the impact of the population differential on the tax gap. The exact relation is depicted in 
Figure 2 (left-hand side). Even though the population differential retains a statistically significant 
effect at conventional levels throughout the entire range taken by the trade integration variable 
(i.e., the 90% confidence intervals – calculated to account for the covariance of the two variables 
– do not cross zero within this interval), the strength of this effect is decreasing in trade 
integration. This finding confirms part ii) of Proposition 1, and illustrates the empirical relevance 
of the models of tax competition based on New Economic Geography frameworks. It suggests 
that tax disparities across countries can indeed be partly explained by the fact that some countries 
are exposed to tax competition to a different degree than others. 
 
--- Figure 2 about here --- 
 
Interestingly, Column (1) also indicates that trade liberalization has no direct impact on the 
tax gap when both countries are of equal size (i.e., when 0=Ω ), which is in line with theoretical 
predictions for interior equilibria (see equation 6a). However, using the interaction term to 
calculate the effect of trade integration over the entire range of population differential in our 
sample, we find that it does significantly affect the tax differential whenever the population 
differential exceeds roughly 100 million inhabitants (which is the case in about 15% of our 
sample). The exact relation is depicted in Figure 2 (right-hand side). When the population 
differential is ‘large enough’, the effect of trade integration is to decrease the tax rate of the 
larger country relative to that of the smaller one. This provides support for the theoretical 
prediction that, for interior equilibria, the overall effect of trade integration on the bilateral tax 
differential is negative (from the perspective of the bigger country). 
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In column (2), we find that the tax gap is significantly positively affected by the size of the 
‘origin’ country and significantly negatively by that of the ‘destination’ country. This is in line 
with expectations. Moreover, the difference in coefficient estimates for origin- and destination-
countries indeed suggests an asymmetry across countries. Coefficient estimates for the origin 
countries are higher (in absolute values), and the mediating effect of trade integration through the 
population of destination countries is somewhat weaker (in a statistical sense). Nonetheless, in 
both cases, the results confirm the predictions from the theoretical model: i.e., trade integration 
weakens the link between market size differences and corporate income tax differences across 
countries.26 
Turning briefly to our control variables, we find that the sign of the unemployment 
difference is at odds with the idea that higher unemployment is costly in terms of unemployment 
benefits (leading to higher tax rates). Rather, it suggests that governments use corporate tax cuts 
as a device to reduce unemployment by attracting new firms (e.g., Exbrayat et al., 2010; Haufler 
and Mittermaier, 2011). The difference in the share of youngsters across countries is associated 
with a significantly reduced corporate tax gap between these countries, while the difference in 
share of elderly has no consistent effect across estimations. The GDP-gap, differences in 
urbanness and governments’ political leaning have no consistent effect (in terms of either sign 
and/or statistical significance) across different specifications. EU membership of one of both 
countries never has an independent additional effect on the corporate tax gap between them (for 
related findings, see Besley et al., 2001; Crabbé and Vandenbussche, 2008; Davies and Voget, 
2008). 
 
3.4   Robustness analyses 
3.4.1. Persistence and alternative corporate tax measures 
Since the tax gap between countries – just like the tax rates of individual countries – is likely 
to show significant persistence over time, it appears reasonable to evaluate whether any such 
persistence affects our core findings (even though no clear argument in favour of such inclusion 
                                                 
26
  Note that the φ-coefficient is statistically significant in Column (2). This should, however, not be mis-interpreted 
as it derives from the difference in the empirical specification. Indeed, in Column (1), the φ-coefficient gives the 
effect of trade liberalization when countries are equal-sized whereas in Column (2) it describes the effect of trade 
liberalization when the population is equal to zero in both the origin and destination countries (a much more 
stringent condition, which, obviously, does not occur in our data). 
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flows from our theoretical model). Hence, we re-estimated the model including a lagged 
dependent variable. Although panel-data estimators are well-known to generate biased and 
inconsistent results in the presence of a lagged dependent variable, the length of our time series 
(over 20 years) implies that any such bias is likely to be small (Nickell, 1981). Nonetheless, we 
cautiously instrument the lagged dependent variable with two further lags.27  The results are 
given in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2, and indicate the there is substantial persistence in tax 
differentials, but, crucially, this does not affect our core findings. Trade integration consistently 
mitigates the link between market size differences and corporate income tax differences.28  
In the remaining columns of Table (2), we furthermore illustrate that this same conclusion 
holds for alternative operationalisations of the tax measure. Although the theoretical model is 
predicated on greenfield investments (see above), Columns (5) through (10) evaluate the 
empirical model’s robustness by using statutory tax rates and Effective Marginal Tax Rates 
(EMTR). A priori, one would expect weaker effects when using EMTR-differences between 
country-pairs as the dependent variable. The reason is that this measure of taxation is relevant for 
marginal investment decisions rather than discrete ones. For differences in statutory tax rates 
between countries (Stattax), however, one could expect similar if not stronger results than those 
for EATR. Statutory tax rates are the most directly observable measure of corporate taxation, and 
can thus more easily be compared from one country to another.  
 
--- Table 2 about here --- 
 
The results in Table 2 confirm the above intuitions. While the results are qualitatively 
similar to those in Table 1, the model performs better when using EATR rather than EMTR as 
dependent variable. Indeed, both the static and dynamic model’s R² reaches its lowest level when 
we use EMTR (see Columns (5) through (7)). Using statutory tax rate differences (i.e., Columns 
                                                 
27
 A similar approach to instrumenting the lagged dependent variable is taken in Devereux et al. (2008). The validity 
of these instruments is confirmed by a standard Hansen test in all regressions (except when using the statutory tax 
as dependent variable, see Table 2).  
28
 Alternatively, we could account for persistence by calculating autocorrelation-robust standard errors. Specifying 
the model with a kernel-based estimation of standard errors that are robust to both arbitrary heteroskedasticity and 
arbitrary autocorrelation (using the Bartlett or Newey-West kernel and specifying bandwidths ranging between 
two and five) leaves all results qualitatively unaffected (details upon request). 
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(8) through (10)), we find largely similar results than those when using EATR in section 3.3 
above (except that the dynamic regression does not pass the Hansen test).  
Note also, as indicated above, that our results are robust to using the tax rate levied on 
investments in machinery, buildings or a weighted average of both. This holds for EATR as well 
as EMTR (details upon request). 
 
3.4.2 Non-linear trade cost effects? 
As a corollary to the analysis of the Nash tax gap (see section 2.3), it is interesting to point 
out that trade costs have a non-linear effect on the tax gap between countries as soon as there is a 
positive population gap. Specifically, tax disparities can be shown to exhibit a concave relation 
with trade costs ( 0/ 22 <∆∗ τdd ). This holds both for the interior equilibrium (in section 2.3.1) 
and the core-periphery equilibrium (in section 2.3.2) – with the sole difference that the 
relationship between the tax gap and trade costs is not strictly increasing (but rather hump-
shaped with a maximum value at 2/MCPττ = ) in the latter case (Figure 3). 
 
--- Figure 3 about here --- 
 
To illustrate this more formally, note that equations (6a) and (6b) can also be rewritten as, 
respectively: 
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This corollary can be evaluated by estimating a slightly extended version of our empirical 
model: 
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The results are given in Table 3. Clearly, given the presence of the interaction terms between 
trade integration
 
and the population differential, the results on φ
 
and φ² cannot be directly 
interpreted as marginal effects. Nonetheless, it can be easily observed that in both the static and 
dynamic model our results reject the prediction that tax disparities are a concave function of 
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trade costs. Specifically, to the limited extent that such non-linearity exists in the data, it points 
in the opposite direction (note that this finding persists when dropping the interaction terms; 
available upon request). One potential explanation is that the large majority of our sample 
concerns highly developed countries with relatively high levels of trade integration. 
Consequently, variation in integration in our sample might well be too limited to pick up these 
finer distinctions. Unfortunately, however, data from a wider sample of countries is unavailable. 
 
--- Table 3 about here --- 
 
3.4.3 Third country effects with asymmetric trade costs 
The three-country extension of our theoretical model described in appendix A (where the 
third country is interpreted as the rest of the world) illustrates that, when all country-pairs share 
the same level of trade integration, proposition 1 still holds regarding the most realistic case of 
interior equilibria. While the analytical expressions become quite complex in a theoretical model 
allowing for variation in trade integration across country-pairs, it seems reasonable to lift this 
restriction in the empirical analysis. This, however, is not innocuous with respect to the empirical 
specification. Clearly, symmetric levels of trade integration between three countries (denoted 1, 
2 and 3) imply that country 1 and 2 enjoy the same access to country 3. This makes that the 
relative attractiveness of country 1 with respect to country 2 – which drives their difference in 
tax base elasticity and the tax gap between them (see above) – is unaffected by both countries’ 
relation to country 3. As serving the market in country 3 is just as easy from country 1 than 2, 
this plays no role in the tax-setting process. Allowing for asymmetric trade integration, this is no 
longer true and the attractiveness of country 1 relative to country 2 will now also depend on both 
countries’ relative size and integration with country 3. The reason is that this reflects how 
profitable it is to serve the third country from country 1 as compared to country 2. Consequently, 
the bilateral tax gap (i.e., between country 1 and 2) will then also depend on the population 
differentials and bilateral levels of trade integration with respect to the third country. This 
implies extending the empirical model in the following way when accounting for third country 
effects with asymmetric trade costs: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ijttjiijtjktjktiktiktijtijt
jktiktijtjktiktijtijt
DOYPopGapPopGapPopGap
PopGapPopGapPopGapTaxGap
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where we expect positive signs for β5 and β9, negative ones for β6 and β8 and signs as before for 
β4 and β7. The intuition is the following: i) PopGapikt exerts a positive influence on the absolute 
level of taxation in country i (and, ceteris paribus, also on TaxGapijt) while PopGapjkt exerts a 
positive influence on the absolute level of taxation in country j (and, ceteris paribus, a negative 
influence on TaxGapijt) and ii) both relationships are attenuated by trade integration.  
Unfortunately, we cannot estimate this regression directly because of a severe collinearity 
problem. Indeed, when the difference in population between countries i and j increases, it 
mechanically increases (decreases) the population gap between country i (j) and the rest of the 
world. To overcome this problem, we redefine the third-country part of the model in terms of the 
population of country i relative to the total population in the 26 OECD countries in our sample. 
The resulting variable – RelPopikt – is independent of PopGapijt, and the difference in population 
between country j and k is (weakly) negatively correlated with ijtPopGap  so that a change in 
PopGapjkt  is incorporated in our empirical model through ijtPopGap  and RelPopikt. Hence, we 
estimate the following regression, where Openikt denotes the overall trade openness of country i: 
( )
( ) ijttjiijtiktikt
iktiktijtijtijtijtijt
DOYOpenelPopR
elPopROpenPopGapPopGapTaxGap
εηββ
ββϕββϕβ
+++++×+
++×++=
76
54321
 
Results are reported in Table 4. First, we can observe that controlling for third country effects 
does not affect our main results: that is, the tax differential between i and j remains increasing 
with their population gap and this relationship is weakened by bilateral trade integration. The 
coefficient estimates are also very similar, suggesting that subsuming third-country effects into 
our fixed effects did not generate significant bias in our inferences. Second, the results provide 
evidence for the existence of significant third-country effects. As expected, the relative size of a 
country with respect to the rest of the world has a positive impact on its tax difference with 
country j, and this relationship is significantly weakened by its trade openness to the world.  
 
--- Table 4 about here --- 
 
3.4.4. Income effects 
     One central simplification of the theoretical model is that it abstracts from income effects by 
approximating demand in country i by its population size and assuming quasi-linear preferences. 
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To overcome this, we can introduce a more general measure for countries’ market potential. 
Specifically, we rely on the real market potential variable provided by the CEPII, which has 
several advantages.29 First, it is estimated from a theory-grounded gravity equation, which 
implies that trade liberalisation is estimated rather than approximated by, say, the inverse of 
distance (see section 3.3). Second, it takes into account that the market potential of a country is 
not only increasing with demand coming from other countries but also decreasing with the 
average price in those countries. Finally, it is estimated using a dataset covering more than 150 
countries, thus allowing us to indirectly take into account third-country effects. 
        Using this real market potential variable, we estimate the following regression: 
ijttjiijtijtijtijt DOYRmpGapTaxGap εηββϕβ ++++++= 321  
where RmpGapijt denotes the difference in the real market potential of countries i and j.30 We 
expect β2 to be positive, since, all else equal, an increase in the real market potential in country i 
means this country becomes more profitable for firms and thus can attract more capital, allowing 
its government to raise taxation. As this market potential measure inherently accounts for trade 
integration effects (see section 3.3), no interaction with trade integration is required here. 
 
--- Table 5 about here --- 
 
 The results reported in Table 5 – Columns (1) and (2) – confirm that the difference in 
market potential has a significant positive impact on the tax gap. This complements the results 
provided in Davies and Voget (2008) and Exbrayat (2011), which show that a countries’ market 
potential has a positive impact on absolute levels of corporate taxation. To take the analysis one 
step further, Columns (3) and (4) present results when the market potential differential is 
decomposed into the difference in domestic and foreign market potential. This allows evaluating 
whether the difference in domestic market potential rather than foreign market potential matters 
most for governments.31 The results illustrate that both elements have a significant positive 
impact on the tax difference. Clearly, however, given the scale of both variables, the difference 
                                                 
29
  http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/marketpotentials.htm 
30
  We exclude PopGapijt from this model as it is highly correlated with RmpGapijt (r=0.65; p<0.01). 
31
 We approximate domestic market potential by the difference between (predicted) total market potential and 
(predicted) foreign market potential. 
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in domestic market potential exerts a stronger impact. This is not surprising, as a firm’s mark-up 
is higher for domestic sales than for foreign ones because of trade costs. 
 
3.4.5 Alternative constellation of control variables 
Finally, one could argue that including variables for the EMU leads to overspecification of 
the model, in that such variables will, by definition, be highly correlated with a shift in trade 
integration between the countries involved. Still, as shown in Table 6, excluding these variables 
does not affect our main findings. 
 
--- Table 6 about here --- 
 
4.    Concluding discussion 
This paper contributes to the literature on international corporate income tax competition by 
analysing the determinants of international tax disparities – thereby focusing on the potential role 
of trade integration. We build on recent insights from the tax competition literature based on 
New Economic Geography (NEG) frameworks to analyse the relation between asymmetric 
market size, trade integration and business income taxation. This literature illustrates that the 
difference in capital taxation between imperfectly integrated countries is increasing with their 
population difference, but, crucially, that this relationship is weakeend as trade costs fall. We 
provide the, to the best of our knowledge, first empirical test of these two predictions: a) tax 
differentials are a function of the coexistence of imperfect trade integration and asymmetric 
market sizes and b) increased trade integration reduces the ability of large countries to set higher 
taxes.  
Our results – based on a panel dataset of 26 OECD countries over the period 1982-2004– 
provide considerable evidence in favour of both propositions. That is, the difference in 
population between two countries increases the tax gap between them, ceteris paribus, and this 
relationship is weakened by trade liberalization. These findings are robust to different measures 
of corporate taxation and the inclusion of third-country and income effects. They provide one 
potential explanation for the considerably decline in tax disparities between OECD countries 
since the early 1980s (see Figure 1). Moreover, from a policy perspective, our evidence supports 
Ottaviano and van Ypersele’s (2005, 45) contention that “the policy attitude towards tax 
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competition [and tax coordination or harmonization] should depend on the degree of trade 
integration” – and substantiates the US Treasury’s fear that globalization is eroding the US’ 
ability to sustain higher tax rates compared to other countries (see introduction). 
While our analysis provides a first attempt at explaining international tax disparities from 
a New Economic Geography perspective, various questions remain. One concerns the so-called 
‘home market effect’: i.e., the fact that the country with a larger demand for the increasing 
returns industry attracts an even larger share of production. While earlier work gives somewhat 
mixed evidence on the existence of a home market effect in general (e.g., Davis and Weinstein, 
2003; Crozet and Trionfetti, 2008; Behrens et al., 2009), another way to empirically address 
NEG models’ predictions would be to separate between low-tax and high-tax countries in such 
studies. Technically, the prediction is that high-tax countries remain net importers of capital, as 
their attractiveness should overcompensate their higher tax-setting in equilibrium (see section 
2.3.1). Another question is to what extent higher taxes set by some countries truly results from 
their attractiveness with respect to mobile firms or from the fact that they host an industrial 
cluster (which induces firms’ immobility and allows governments to tax them more severely). In 
the latter case, the higher corporate tax rate would not result from asymmetric tax competition 
with an interior location equilibrium, but from rent-seeking behaviour towards immobile firms. 
One possibility to address this in future work might be to move the analysis from the country to 
the sectoral level, thereby exploiting the variation in the extent of industrial clustering across 
sectors (cf. Brülhart et al., 2009).  Finally, it would be interesting to extend the theoretical model 
by allowing not only for different market sizes but also different production costs to test whether 
or not trade integration reduces the comparative advantage of the low-cost country. 
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Table 1: Estimation results for the baseline regression (1982-2004) 
Variable (1) EATR 
(2) 
EATR 
Intercept 0.496* 
(1.73) 
0.265 
(0.91) 
φ 
 
-0.035 
(-0.21) 
0.886*** 
(3.99) 
PopGap 0.257*** 
(17.46) 
- 
PopGap * φ -0.451** 
(-2.24) 
- 
Pop-origin - 10.80*** 
(6.34) 
Pop-origin
 * φ - -21.50*** 
(-4.83) 
Pop-destination - -0.217*** 
(-17.24) 
Pop-destination * φ - -0.188* 
(-1.79) 
RealGDPGap 0.326*** 
(3.81) 
0.283 *** 
(3.25) 
PconsGap -0.001 
(-0.61) 
-0.001 
(-0.77) 
UnempGap -0.006*** 
(-11.27) 
-0.007*** 
(-11.74) 
OldGap 0.001 
(0.43) 
-0.001 
(0.68) 
YouGap -0.011*** 
(-10.16) 
-0.011*** 
(-10.42) 
UrbGap -0.004*** 
(-5.15) 
-0.004*** 
(-4.75) 
LeftGap -0.001 
(-0.81) 
-0.001 
(-0.78) 
OpenGap -0.001*** 
(-5.19) 
-0.001*** 
(-5.35) 
EMUsingle 
 
EMUboth 
 
0.007 
(1.09) 
0.003 
(0.51) 
0.010 
(1.55) 
0.009 
(1.35) 
Country dummies (O & D) 
Year dummies 
Trend 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
N 
R² (overall) 
4730 
0.812 
4730 
0.816 
Note: Dependent variable: EATRGap; t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors and clustered by origin-country-year in parenthesis: 
*** significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
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Table 2: Results using alternative tax measures and introducing lagged dependent variable (1982-2004) 
Variable (3) EATR 
(4) 
EATR 
(5) 
EMTR 
(6) 
EMTR 
(7) 
EMTR 
(8) 
Stattax 
(9) 
Stattax 
(10) 
Stattax 
Intercept 0.011 
(0.13) 
-0.034 
(-0.37) 
0.555* 
(1.65) 
0.049 
(0.48) 
-0.010 
(-0.10) 
0.487 
(1.62) 
0.037 
(0.37) 
-0.026 
(-0.25) 
Lagged dependent variable 0.679*** 
(18.74) 
0.674*** 
(18.45) 
- 0.648*** 
(16.81) 
0.769*** 
(16.49) 
- 0.685*** 
(19.49) 
0.679*** 
(19.15) 
φ 
 
0.119 
(1.50) 
0.457*** 
(3.26) 
0.007 
(0.03) 
0.142 
(1.50) 
0.506*** 
(3.25) 
-0.149 
(-0.86) 
0.042 
(0.48) 
0.529*** 
(3.37) 
PopGap 0.073*** 
(4.80) 
- 0.272*** 
(15.14) 
0.089*** 
(5.27) 
- 0.284*** 
(16.26) 
0.092*** 
(5.14) 
- 
PopGap * φ -0.244* 
(-1.76) 
- -0.466** 
(-2.00) 
-0.286* 
(-1.79) 
- -0.684** 
(-2.49) 
-0.369** 
(-2.19) 
- 
Pop-origin - 0.234*** 
(2.84) 
- - 0.245*** 
(2.85) 
- - 0.314*** 
(2.94) 
Pop-origin
 * φ - -0.915** 
(-2.32) 
- - -0.953** 
(-2.22) 
- - -13.50*** 
(-3.27) 
Pop-destination - -0.065*** 
(-4.38) 
- - -0.055*** 
(-4.95) 
- - -0.083*** 
(-4.61) 
Pop-destination * φ - 0.005 
(0.08) 
- - 0.006 
(0.25) 
- - 0.022 
(0.27) 
N 
R² (overall) 
Anderson Canonical 
Hansen 
4103 
0.935 
3385.5*** 
0.358 
4103 
0.935 
3330.2*** 
0.357 
4730 
0.760 
4103 
0.923 
3496.1*** 
0.007 
4103 
0.923 
3445.7*** 
0.007 
4993 
0.819 
4439 
0.931 
3787.1*** 
3.353* 
4103 
0.931 
3741.5*** 
3.375* 
Note: t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and clustered by origin-country-year in parenthesis: *** significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 
10%. Anderson Canonical correlation statistic tests for weak identifying restrictions, while Hansen is the test for over-identifying restrictions. Control variables 
as in Table 1 included in every regression. 
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Table 3: Estimation results for the extended regression (1982-2004) 
Variable EATR (11) EATR (12) 
Intercept 0.462 
(1.62) 
0.007 
(0.08) 
Lagged dependent variable - 
 
0.680*** 
(18.76) 
φ
 
-0.004 
(-0.01) 
0.484** 
(2.43) 
φ²
 
2.026 
(0.45) 
-6.101*** 
(-2.60) 
PopGap 0.239*** 
(13.96) 
0.070*** 
(4.34) 
PopGap * φ 11.000** 
(2.00) 
-0.314 
(-0.93) 
PopGap * φ² -315.600*** 
(-3.47) 
26.000 
(0.53) 
N 
R² (overall) 
Anderson Canonical 
Hansen 
4730 
0.812 
4103 
0.935 
3372.0*** 
0.396 
Note: Dependent variable: EATRGap; t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard errors and clustered by origin-country-year in parenthesis: *** significant at 
1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. Anderson Canonical correlation statistic tests for weak 
identifying restrictions, while Hansen is the test for over-identifying restrictions. 
Control variables as in Table 1 included in every regression. 
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Table 4: Controlling for third-country effects (1982-2004) 
 
 
Variable 
(13) 
EATR 
(14) 
EATR 
(15) 
EMTR 
(16) 
EMTR 
(17) 
Stattax 
(18) 
Stattax 
Intercept 12.112*** 
(6.91) 
3.194*** 
(3.24) 
14.906*** 
(6.93) 
4.114*** 
(3.43) 
10.018*** 
(5.62) 
3.259*** 
(2.63) 
Lagged dependent 
variable 
- 0.667*** 
(18.03) 
- 0.634*** 
(16.09) 
- 0.679*** 
(18.94) 
φ
 
-0.099 
(-0.68) 
0.067 
(0.84) 
-0.075 
(-0.42) 
0.080 
(0.86) 
-0.199 
(-1.22) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
PopGap 0.261*** 
(19.24) 
0.082*** 
(5.02) 
0.279*** 
(17.29) 
0.099*** 
(5.60) 
0.285*** 
(16.62) 
0.101*** 
(5.02) 
PopGap * φ 
 
Openness 
 
RelPop 
 
RelPop * Openness 
 
-0.383** 
(-1.96) 
-0.012*** 
(-5.66) 
12.2*** 
(6.67) 
-0.010*** 
(-5.93) 
-0.218* 
(-1.65) 
-0.005*** 
(-2.87) 
3.30*** 
(3.24) 
-0.004*** 
(-3.02) 
-0.380* 
(-1.71) 
-0.015*** 
(-6.03) 
15.1*** 
(6.70) 
-0.001*** 
(-6.27) 
-0.253* 
(-1.65) 
-0.006*** 
(-3.07) 
0.422*** 
(3.40) 
-0.001*** 
(-3.21) 
-0.634** 
(-2.29) 
-0.009*** 
(-3.90) 
10.100*** 
(5.39) 
-0.0001*** 
(-4.05) 
-0.346** 
(-2.12) 
-0.004** 
(-2.09) 
0.336*** 
(2.61) 
-0.0004** 
(-2.21) 
N 
R² (overall) 
Anderson 
Hansen  
4730 
0.819 
4103 
0.936 
3304.8*** 
0.463 
4730 
0.770 
4103 
0.924 
3414.0*** 
0.028 
4993 
0.822 
4439 
0.931 
3745.9*** 
3.335* 
Note: t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and clustered by origin-country-year in parenthesis: 
*** significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. Anderson Canonical correlation statistic tests for weak identifying 
restrictions, while Hansen is the test for over-identifying restrictions. Control variables as in Table 1 included in 
every regression. 
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Table 5: Robustness checks: Introducing market potential (1982-2003) 
 
 
Variable 
(19) 
EATR 
(20) 
EATR 
(21) 
EATR 
(22) 
EATR 
Intercept 0.064 
(0.23) 
0.003 
(0.03) 
0.197 
(0.76) 
0.039 
(0.36) 
Lagged dependent 
variable 
- 0.649*** 
(17.48) 
- 0.631*** 
(15.66) 
φ
 
-0.070 
(-0.35) 
0.129 
(1.24) 
-0.056 
(-0.30) 
0.129 
(1.28) 
RmpGap 1.66*** 
(13.21) 
0.651*** 
(6.19) 
- - 
DRmpGap 
 
- - 1.520*** 
(7.86) 
0.653** 
(2.34) 
FRmpGap 
 
- - 0.0004*** 
(11.47) 
0.0001*** 
(6.15) 
N 
R² (overall) 
Anderson 
Hansen 
4477 
0.823 
3850 
0.937 
3020.2*** 
0.265 
4477 
0.830 
3850 
0.937 
2826.1*** 
0.148 
Note: t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and clustered by 
origin-country-year in parenthesis: *** significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
Anderson Canonical correlation statistic tests for weak identifying restrictions, while 
Hansen is the test for over-identifying restrictions. Control variables as in Table 1 
included in every regression. 
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Table 6: Excluding EMU-variables (1982-2004) 
 
 
Variable 
(23) 
EATR 
(24) 
EATR 
Intercept 0.502* 
(1.73) 
0.019 
(0.20) 
Lagged dependent 
variable 
- 0.678*** 
(18.34) 
φ
 
-0.030 
(-0.17) 
0.136 
(1.63) 
PopGap 0.258*** 
(17.88) 
0.076*** 
(4.79) 
PopGap * φ -0.461** 
(-2.21) 
-0.254* 
(-1.76) 
N 
R² (overall) 
Anderson 
Hansen  
4730 
0.811 
4103 
0.935 
3383.4*** 
0.264 
Note: t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard errors and clustered by origin-country-
year in parenthesis: *** significant at 1%, ** at 
5% and * at 10%. Anderson Canonical correlation 
statistic tests for weak identifying restrictions, 
while Hansen is the test for over-identifying 
restrictions. Control variables as in Table 1 
included in every regression, except EMUsingle 
and EMUboth. 
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Figure 1: Corporate tax rate levels and convergence in OECD countries 
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Figure 2: Graphical representation of interaction effects (baseline regression) 
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Figure 3: Trade costs and the tax gap 
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Appendix A: The three-country model 
Consider an economy consisting of three imperfectly integrated countries (i=1,2,3), with 
a share ( )1,0∈iσ  of the total population (L) living in country i and the same level of trade 
integration the across country-pairs.32 
The consumption behaviour is similar to that of the two country model (see Section 2.1). 
Firms’ operating profits now depend on sales made in the domestic and the two foreign 
countries. In the following, we present output levels for a firm located in country 1 (symmetric 
expressions hold for firms located in the other countries), whose level of operating profit is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1331221111 xwpxwpxwp ττ −−+−−+−=Π  
Maximizing the above expression taking into account demand yields the following output levels: 
( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
,
1
1
    ,
1
1 33
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where ( )1,0∈iλ  stands for the share of the capital stock invested in country i. Observe that these 
expressions are similar to those of the two-country model: i.e., supply for a given market is 
decreasing with the share of firms located in this country, and this competition effect is 
strengthened by the level of trade costs.  
The resulting price equilibrium in country i is given by: 
( )
1
1
+
+−+
=
K
wKKa
p ii
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which has, again, the same properties as in the two-country model. We assume, as before, that 
the level of trade cost is not prohibitive so that it is always profitable for a firm to export 
( ) ( )( )1+−=< Kwatradeττ . 
In the long run, the spatial distribution of firms is found by solving the arbitrage 
condition according to which no unit of capital can induce a higher net return by being invested 
in another country; that is, when rttt =−Π=−Π=−Π ∗∗∗ 332211 . In the free-market equilibrium 
characterized by the absence of fiscal policy, the resulting share of firms located in country i is: 
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 Clearly, in reality, levels of trade integration are likely to vary across country-pairs. We rely on this simplification 
here as an extension of the 3-country model allowing for different levels of trade costs across country-pairs 
becomes (very close to) intractable. This assumption is relaxed in the empirical analysis in section 3.3.4. 
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Note that the main incentives to locate in the largest market are still at work in this three-country 
model. More precisely, the share of capital invested in a country is increasing with the share of 
total population in this country, and this effect strengthens as trade costs fall. 
 Now, assuming that governments implement a redistributive fiscal policy, the share of 
capital invested in country 1 becomes: 
( ) ( ) ( )
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and symmetric expressions hold for the share of capital invested in countries 2 and 3. Thus, 
intuitively, the share of capital invested in a country decreases with the tax differential with 
respect to each of the other countries. 
 Let us now describe the tax competition outcome. We focus on the most realistic case of 
interior location equilibria.33 In order to assess the importance of third-country effects on tax 
differentials, we describe the tax gap between countries 1 and 2 and consider country 3 as the 
rest of the world. Let us denote by ( )L21 σσ −=Ω  the population differential between countries 1 
and 2.34 Their bilateral tax gap ( *2*1*12 tt −=∆ ) is given by: 
                                                 
( )
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KK
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22
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12
τ
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           (7) 
where ΛΞΣΦ ,,, and Γ  are bundles of parameters that depend exclusively on the distribution of 
capital ownership (available upon request). We check that ΞΦ,  and Γ are positive for all 
( )1,0∈iσ , whereas the sign of Σ  and Λ is ambiguous.  
The bilateral tax gap in the three-country model (7) closely mirrors that of the two-
country model (6a). Indeed, observe that: i) the tax gap between two countries is proportional to 
                                                 
33
  When trade costs reach low values, all capital is invested in the most populated country and the tax competition 
game is equivalent to the core-periphery case described in section 2.3.1, except that there are now two peripheral 
countries. Proposition 1 also holds under such a configuration. Results are available upon request. 
34
  We verify that the reaction functions are linear, with a slope positive and lower than unity, as in the two-country 
model. 
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their population differential and ii) is equal to zero if and only if countries are equal-sized.35 In 
order to determine more precisely the properties of the tax gap (7), we need to determine the sign 
of the two following derivatives: 
( )
( ) Γ+Λ−Ξ
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d
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After tedious calculations, we show that these derivatives are both positive. We summarize these 
results by the following proposition. 
Proposition 1-bis (three-country model): Assume tax competition between three benevolent 
governments of differently populated countries. For interior location equilibria: 
(i) The tax gap between two countries is increasing with the difference in population between 
these countries, for a given population in the rest of the world. 
(ii)  This relationship is mitigated as trade costs fall. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1-bis i): 
We first show that: 
          ( ) 022 >Γ+Λ−ΞKK                (8) 
Recall that Ξ  is positive. Moreover, we evaluate whether Λ−Γ K2  is positive for all admissible 
values of  iσ , so that inequality (8) always holds. 
Then, we show that: 
    ( ) 02 >Σ−Φ− τwa                       (9) 
Observe that this expression is a monotonic function of τ , and is positive when trade costs equal 
zero. Moreover, since we assumed that trade costs take only non-prohibitive values ( )tradeττ < , a 
sufficient condition for inequality (9) to hold is that ( ) 02 >Σ−Φ− tradewa τ . We can show that 
( ) Ζ=Σ−Φ− tradetradewa ττ2 , with Z a bundle of parameters which is positive for all admissible 
values of iσ . Thus, inequality (9) holds for non-prohibitive trade costs and we can conclude that 
0*12 >Ω∆ dd .  ■ 
 
                                                 
35
  Observe, however, that the total capital stock had second-order effects on the tax gap in the two-country model 
whereas these second-order effects depend on the spatial distribution of capital ownership in the three-country 
model. 
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Proof of Proposition 1-bis ii):  
Given the inequality (8), we get 0*122 >Ω∆ τddd  provided that 
    ( ) 0>Σ−Φ− τwa                       (10) 
Similar to before, this expression is a monotonic function of τ , and is positive when trade costs 
equal zero. Thus, a sufficient condition for inequality (10) to hold is that ( ) 0>Σ−Φ− tradewa τ . 
After manipulations, we get: ( ) ( )Θ+Ψ=Σ−Φ− KKwa tradetrade 2ττ , with Ψ and Θ  bundle of 
parameters that depend exclusively on iσ . For all admissible values of iσ , Ψ  is positive. This 
implies that ( )Θ+ΨKK trade 2τ  is positive for all ΨΘ−> 2K . Using the fact that parameters iσ  
lie in the interval (0,1), simulations show that ( )21,22 −∈ΨΘ− . Finally, recall that we assume 
oligopolistic competition, with a perfect correspondence between the number of firms and capital 
units so that K is higher than unity. Hence, the inequalities ΨΘ−> 2K  and (10) hold for all 
admissible values of K , τ  and iσ  and we can conclude that 0*122 >Ω∆ τddd . ■ 
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Appendix B: Data sources and summary statistics 
EATRit : Effective Average Tax Rate (source: Devereux et al., 2002).   
EMTRit : Effective Marginal Tax Rate (source: Devereux et al., 2002).   
EATRit : Statutory Tax Rate (source: Devereux et al., 2002).   
φijt : Trade integration index (own calculations using Trade and Production and Gravity databases of 
CEPII). 
Rmpit: Real market potential (source: CEPII) 
FRmpit: Foreign real market potential 
DRmpit: Domestic real market potential 
PCONSit : public consumption in percentage of GDP per capita (source: Penn World Tables). 
UNEMPit: standardized unemployment rate (source: OECD Social Expenditures database). 
RealGDPit: real GDP per capita (source: Penn World Tables). 
POPit: population (in thousand) (source: Penn World Tables). 
OPENit: trade openness (source: Penn World Tables). 
LEFTit: Coded 1 if executive right-wing, 0 if centre and -1 if left-wing (source: World Bank: Database of 
Political Institutions). 
URBit: proportion of population living in urban areas (source: World Bank Development Indicators). 
OLDit: proportion of population over age 65 (source: World Bank Development Indicators). 
YOUit: proportion of population under age 14 (source: World Bank Development Indicators). 
EMUsingleit: dummy = 1 if only one country in a country-pair ij is member of EMU (or its predecessors). 
EMUbothit: dummy = 1 if both countries in a country-pair ij are member of EMU (or its predecessors). 
 
Summary statistics for variables in differences (1982-2004) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
EATRGap -0.006 0.119 -0.460 0.469 
EMTRGap -0.007 0.128 -0.511 0.524 
StattaxGap -0.004 0.139 -0.55 0.517 
RmpGap 
FRmpGap 
DRmpGap 
PopGap 
-0.00034 
1.34 E-06 
-0.00034 
-0.01997 
0.00237 
6.36 E-06 
0.00237 
0.08092 
-104.00 
-32.6 E-06 
-104.00 
-0.29251 
0.00743 
32.5 E-06 
0.00743 
0.12347 
OldGap 0.095 2.929 -8.450 7.450 
YouGap -0.727 3-899 -13.66 12.14 
UrbGap 1.934 15.613 -38.8 44.8 
RealGDPGap 0.00091 0.0069 -0.0279 0.0282 
PconsGap -1.151 5.931 -26.02 22.93 
UnempGap 0.696 5.764 -20.5 21.2 
LeftGap -0.076 1.284 -2 2 
OpenGap 0.561 38.963 -142.011 163.823 
Note: RealGDPGap in million; PopGap in billion; RmpGap, FRmpGap and DrmpGap in trillion (to make 
coefficient estimates more readable in Tables 1 through 6). 
 
Summary statistics for estimated trade integration variable (1982-2004) 
 φ Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Overall 0.00233 0.00632 1.39e-07 0.10009 N =    8125 
Between country-pairs  0.00294 0.00018 0.02043 n =     325 
Within country-pairs  0.00559 -0.01806 0.08199 T =      25 
